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Approche par les capabilités
Handicap
Bien être
About a decade ago, scholars in different disciplines started using the capability approach (CA) to
deﬁne disability (e.g., Burchardt, 2004; Mitra, 2006; Morris, 2009; Terzi, 2005a, 2005b). Under the
CA, disability has been conceptualized as a deprivation in terms of functionings (achievements) or
capabilities (practical opportunities). Whether an individual with an impairment or health problem
has a disability depends on whether his/her functionings or capabilities are restricted. In this context,
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there have been a number of comparisons of the CA and the International Classiﬁcation of Functioning,
Health and Disability (ICF). Some authors have pointed out shortcomings of the ICF compared to the
CA.
In Reconciling the Capability Approach and the ICF,  Jerome Bickenbach asks for caution in “this head-
to-head comparison” and attempts, ﬁrst, to clarify what the CA and the ICF are and are not and, second,
to reconcile the CA and the ICF. This is a difﬁcult task as ICF is both a model and a classiﬁcation, and
as there is not a single treatment of disability from the perspective of the CA. Bickenbach’s literature
review spans a very broad territory. He starts with a careful and comprehensive account of the CA and
its applications to deﬁne disability. Although the literature has been mostly focused on applying Sen’s
version of the CA, Bickenbach also presents Nussbaum’s version. In addition, Bickenbach goes over
uses of the CA to deﬁne health, and he rightfully points out that authors focused on disability have not
engaged with the deﬁnition of health.
Bickenbach’s main argument is that the ICF has been misunderstood. I will thus start with what
the ICF is and how is has been used so far, then take up Bickenbach’s reactions to the major criticisms
of the ICF that he identiﬁes in the CA literature. Finally, I will react to Bickenbach’s proposal for a
reconciliation.
1. What is the ICF and how has it been used?
Bickenbach notes throughout his paper that the ICF is a classiﬁcation. At the risk of explaining
the obvious, I would like to note that a classiﬁcation is a way of organizing information. Bickenbach
writes: “the ICF is a classiﬁcation whose primary purpose is to collect saliant data about the lived
experience of health conditions.” In the book that ﬁrst introduced the ICF, WHO  (2001; p. 25) states
that “as a classiﬁcation, ICF does not model the “process” of functioning and disability. It can be used,
however, to describe the process by providing the means to map  the different constructs and domains.”
However, further along, WHO  (2001; p. 28) ends up describing how the ICF is based on an integration
of the medical and social models. “In order to capture the integration of the various perspectives of
functioning, a “biopsychosocial” approach is used. Thus ICF achieves a synthesis, in order to provide a
coherent view of different perspectives of health from a biological, individual and social perspective”.
This is also noted by Ustun, Chatterji, Bickenbach, Kostanjsek and Schneider (2003): “All features of
the ICF reﬂect the underlying model of functioning and disability. The current ICF model represents
the resolution of a long-lasting theoretical debate between two  competing models.” The authors then
move on to explain the medical and social models. They then note that: “A better model of disability
is one that synthesizes what is true and useful in the medical and social models, without making the
mistake each makes in reducing the whole, complex notion of disability to one of its aspects. This might
be called the biopsychosocial model. The classiﬁcations within ICF are constructed around this model,
an integration of the biomedical and the social. ICF provides, by means of this conceptual synthesis, a
coherent view of health domains as well as domains that are inﬂuenced by or inﬂuence health, namely
health-related domains such as education, employment, community life and so on.”
Bickenbach (2011) alone notes elsewhere: “ICF provides both a model of functioning and disability
and a set of classiﬁcations for describing these phenomena in detail. ICF understands these phenomena
as outcomes of an interaction between an underlying health condition (disease, disorder or injury)
and the full range of environmental factors (physical, human-built, social and attitudinal) and per-
sonal factors.” In the ICF model, disability refers to the negative aspects of the interaction between
an individual (with a health condition) and that individual’s contextual factors (environmental and
personal factors). At the same time, in the ICF classiﬁcation, disability is the umbrella term for impair-
ments, activity limitations and participation restrictions. ICF is thus a model as well as a classiﬁcation,
with the ICF classiﬁcation being conceptually based on the ICF model. For clariﬁcation purpose, when
relevant and applicable, I will now append model or classiﬁcation to ICF.
Recently, Cerniauskaite, Quintas, Boldt, Raggi, Cieza, Bickenbach and Leonardi (2011) conducted a
systematic review of the literature that uses the ICF. They showed that “the majority of publications
(30.8%) were conceptual papers”. Thus it appears that the ICF model has been widely used. The authors
also note that “diffusion of ICF research and use in a great variety of ﬁelds and scientiﬁc journals is a
proof that a cultural change and a new conceptualisation of functioning and disability is happening”.
26 S. Mitra / ALTER, European Journal of Disability Research 8 (2014) 24–29
Inﬂuential publications such as WHO-World Bank (2011) use the ICF-model as a conceptual frame-
work. Thus the ICF is widely used as a model of disability and appears to have been inﬂuential in that
capacity. Cerniauskaite et al. (2011) also ﬁnd that 25.9% of papers were studies focusing on the descrip-
tion of disability of patients in clinical contexts and 9.2% of papers dealt with theoretical descriptions
or practical applications of the ICF in contexts other than health (e.g. disability eligibility, employment,
education, ICF training). In contexts other than health, for example Resnik and Allen (2007) use the ICF
classiﬁcation to analyze qualitative data on the community reintegration of injured veterans. Okawa
and Ueda (2008) ﬁnd that ICF was inﬂuential in national legislation and policy in Japan. Thus, the ICF
has been used for a variety of purposes, to describe but also to explain and analyze the lived experience
of health conditions and to inform policy.
2. What’s wrong with the ICF?
Bickenbach goes over the advantages of the CA as found in the literature and points out those
that are common features of the ICF and the CA, in particular the “role of both impairments and
environmental factors in the creation of disability”, the distinction of deprivation in capabilities and
functionings in the CA and an analogous distinction in the ICF classiﬁcation of capacity qualiﬁer and
performance respectively. Bickenbach also notes the tension in the CA serving as a framework for
individual subjective assessments of wellbeing and as a framework that can be used to inform policy
and thus require standardization. Bickenbach focuses on what he considers to be the three main
shortcomings of the ICF that CA authors have put forward.
2.1. “ICF does not embody a theory of justice”, nor a normative metric
He responds to this ﬁrst criticism in that ICF is a classiﬁcation, not a theory: “ICF is a classiﬁcation,
not a theory of justice applicable to disability.” It is worth noting here that only Nussbaum’s version of
the CA aims to be a theory of justice and that it has not been used in the disability and CA literature1
so it is less relevant here than Sen’s CA. Sen’s CA is a normative framework, not a theory, for deﬁning
wellbeing, poverty and development, and it is that framework that has been primarily used with
respect to disability.
Here my  views are somewhat different from those of Bickenbach or found in the CA literature. The
ICF classiﬁcation is a tool that helps structure data on disability and the lived experience of health
conditions. First, this descriptive work is very important for policy: it can highlight differences and
disadvantages that policy makers may  decide to act upon because to them these are injustices. Thus
descriptions are not done in a vacuum, they may  be used to inform policy.
Secondly and relatedly, it is my  understanding that descriptive work is in fact central to the capa-
bility approach. Sen (2009) argues that a useful theory of justice should not be focused on ﬁnding
the requirements of a “perfectly just” society in a transcendental approach to justice, as mainstream
political philosophers such as John Rawls (1971) have done. Such an approach provides little help
while trying to eliminate “cases of manifest injustice” such as slavery in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries (2009; p. 21–2). Instead, Sen proposes a comparative approach to justice that focuses
on questions related to how justice could be enhanced. To that end, Sen proposes to make comparative
assessments of people’s lives. People’s lives are assessed by looking at what people are able to do and
be, i.e. “capabilities”. Sen (2009) is the fully-ﬂedged argumentation of an approach of justice that uses
this metric of capabilities and focuses on practical human behaviors and situations of injustice. Sen
(2009) expresses a powerful pragmatic idea of justice that may  inﬂuence contemporary political phi-
losophy, and provides a framework for the removal of injustices in the real world. It may  also encourage
those involved with justice, whether at a theoretical level or in the ﬁeld, to dedicate more attention
to improve the lives of people in groups that have been subject to “manifest injustices”. Sen develops
several examples of such groups, including women, slaves and persons with disabilities. I see some
synergy here between the ICF and the CA, in that both value empirical assessments of people’s lives.
1 For a study that considers Nussbaum’s application of the capabilities approach to persons with disabilities and its implica-
tions,  see Stein and Silvers (2007).
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Last, it should be noted that a description, a factual statement, and the presentation of information,
for instance structured by the ICF-classiﬁcation, implies the selection of information. Sen himself
has written on the subject. Sen (1980) notes that “description inevitably involves selection. It can be
usefully seen as a choice of a subset from a set of possible statements” (p. 368). There could be several
motives behind description, including prescription and curiosity. When description is conducted with
a view to prescribe, description becomes normative and the ICF may  be used in that capacity. Given the
variety of motivations in the utilization of the ICF in the past decade, including for policy, as discussed
earlier, the ICF to some extent has been used as a normative metric.
Still in relation to description, Sen (1980; p. 354) notes that “it is perhaps not an exaggeration
to say that any conscious act of description contains some theory-usually implicit-about the relative
importance of the various statements dealing with the subject matter. I shall call this the “choice basis
of description” (p. 354). This takes us to the second and third shortcomings of the ICF that Bickenbach
ﬁnds in the CA literature.
2.2. “ICF does not incorporate choice and personal goals” and “ICF does not distinguish resources and
environments”
In his defense of the ICF on these two  shortcomings, Bickenbach stresses that ICF is a classiﬁcation
and has a descriptive objective. Perhaps this was  the initial intention when the ICF classiﬁcation was
developed with the ICF model included to ground the classiﬁcation. However, as explained earlier,
the ICF has been used both as model and classiﬁcation, and for a variety of objectives, descriptive,
as well as analytical and for policy. Even if the ICF is used to describe, is the lack of information on
choices/personal goals and resources really a lacuna of the ICF? I think it is. How much of a lacuna it is
probably depends on the health conditions and the settings, which are the subject of the description.
If having a particular health condition might be associated with coercion and little consideration
for personal goals, it would be a signiﬁcant lacuna to describe the lived experience of such health
conditions without any consideration for choice and personal goals. For instance, this is particularly
relevant for severe mental illness. It is also relevant more generally for the study of medical decision
making and in particular, shared-decision making. It is no surprise that the capability approach has
been used in these areas (Hopper, 2007; Entwistle & Watt, 2013). The CA has the advantage to link an
individual’s capabilities and functionings with choices/decision-making in between.
The ICF does not explicitly represent how resources may  be a determinant of the lived experience
of health conditions. Bickenbach argues that to some extent it is in the ICF. Environmental factors
include information about the person’s socioeconomic context, but not about what the person owns.
We would not know if a person with a mobility limitation owns the type of wheelchair that is needed.
He notes that this cannot be expected of a classiﬁcation of the lived experience of health conditions.
This would be a signiﬁcant lacuna in resource poor settings where economic resources may  inﬂuence
how individuals and families cope with the consequences of health problems, and thus on the very
lived experience of health conditions, which the ICF is to describe. For instance, in the study of the
challenges that veterans with injuries in the US face to reintegrate into the community, Resnik and
Allen (2007) use the ICF classiﬁcation to structure the data collected from veterans in open-ended
interviews. Perhaps it is not surprising then that there is no consideration for resources in the results,
while poverty is known to be rampant in this population group. Under the CA (Mitra, 2006), resources
are a factor that interacts with the individual’s characteristics and environment that may  lead to
disability in terms of capabilities or functionings.
3. Reconciling the ICF and the CA?
Like Bickenbach, I see some commonalities and some synergies between the ICF and the CA but
I see them differently. Both the ICF and the CA are not theories that can explain wellbeing and dis-
ability, rather they are frameworks to conceptualize these phenomena2. In addition, as noted earlier,
2 A similar point is made by Robeyns (2005) on the CA in general.
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description is central to both the ICF and the CA. The ICF has been used and can be used for prescription,
and thus can be a normative metric, like the CA.
There are also important differences between the CA and the ICF. The CA is an open-ended concep-
tual framework and is more holistic than the ICF in that it includes additional relevant components of
the lived experience such as resources and choices. The ICF leaves out these components of the lived
experience, which implicitly may  tell about the lack of importance of these components. The ICF is
a model to a close-ended classiﬁcation, which is problematic in that it is meant to portray the lived
experience of health conditions, which is complex and multifaceted. Perhaps the ICF can be extended
to become an open-ended framework that recognizes that some aspects of the lived experience are
left out, with the caveat that not all dimensions of life may  be speciﬁed and classiﬁed. Thus the clas-
siﬁcation does not, and cannot be expected to, provide an exhaustive account of the lived experience
of health problems.
A decade after the CA started being used to deﬁne disability, some data collection and research
has been done to operationalize the CA with respect to disability, including disability policy (e.g.
Trani, Bakhshi, Noor, & Mashkoor, 2009; Trani, Bakhshi, Bellanca, Biggeri, & Marchetta, 2011) but
further work is needed in this area. This is an area where Bickenbach points out there is scope for
complementarity and reconciliation between ICF and CA. Indeed, he notes that the CA “will need stable,
valid and comparable data about health and functioning, data that is independent of both cultural and
linguistic variations as well as individual differences in preferences and aspiration. Making it possible
for such important data to be collected, and used, was WHO’s aim in developing the ICF.” In other
words, one could use the ICF-classiﬁcation to operationalize the CA at an international level. I agree
about the importance of collecting internationally comparable data on disability. This call is timely in
preparation of the Post-2015 Development Agenda (Mitra, 2013). I also agree that the ICF-classiﬁcation
can be a tool to implement a CA-based disability measure, in particular to structure data collection on
impairments or health problems, as well as capabilities and functionings. It would need to be expanded
though to capture central aspects of the CA (e.g. resources) that are not in the ICF. Further research is
clearly needed in this area.
Bickenbach goes on to argue that “For better or worse, ICF is the international standard for dis-
ability and functioning data collection: it is the only game in town”. ICF has indeed the monopoly of
an internationally accepted classiﬁcation of functioning and disability, but it is not a data collection
instrument. While it can help structure data collection, it is not absolutely necessary for developing
a data collection instrument on the CA and disability. WHO  has developed a speciﬁc survey instru-
ment based on the ICF: the World Health Organization Disability Assessment Schedule II (WHODAS
II) (WHO, 2009). It covers all types of functional limitations (physical, mental, sensory), for various
countries, languages and contexts, so it is suitable for international use. WHODAS II includes four
alternative versions, with 89 items, 36 items, 12 items and six items.
This questionnaire and more generally the data structure provided by the ICF-classiﬁcation is not
the only way to go about collecting data on the lived experience of health conditions. The Washington
Group on Disability Statistics, which was set up in 2001, also developed a set of questions to collect
internationally comparable information on functional limitations (Madans, Loeb, & Altman, 2011). Its
purpose was to provide guidelines, which would facilitate the production of comparable international
and cross-cultural disability measures that could be used for designing equal opportunity policies. A
set of questions has been agreed upon and tested in different settings. It covers four functional domains
(seeing, hearing, walking and cognition) and two additional domains (self care and communication).
The recommended questionnaire is consistent with the ICF model of disability but did not use the ICF-
classiﬁcation to structure data collection. Data started being collected in several countries on these
six limitations, as well as on a variety of life outcomes (functioning under the CA) (e.g. employment,
educational attainment) (Madans et al., 2011).
4. Concluding remarks
Bickenbach makes a call for caution in the “head-to-head comparison” of the CA and the ICF in
relation to deﬁning disability and describing the lived experience of health conditions. While I agree on
the need for caution, I have a different view on how ICF compares to the CA. Bickenbach reconciles ICF
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and CA by arguing that they are different things, with the ICF being a classiﬁcation aimed at describing
the lived experience of health conditions and the CA being a normative open-ended framework. In
contrast, I argued that ICF is both a model and a classiﬁcation that has been used with a variety of
objectives, in descriptive as well as analytical studies and for policy. The ICF has been used and can be
used for prescription, and thus can be a normative metric, like the CA. Description is central to both
the ICF and the CA.
I see the lack of consideration for choices and resources as shortcomings of the ICF model and
classiﬁcation. The latter could beneﬁt from becoming open-ended, with an explicit caveat that not all
dimensions of life may  be speciﬁed and classiﬁed, and thus the classiﬁcation does not, and cannot be
expected to, provide an exhaustive account of the lived experience of health problems. Bickenbach
points out the potential synergy of the ICF and the CA in that the ICF classiﬁcation can help opera-
tionalize the CA. I agree, but unlike Bickenbach, I do not see the ICF classiﬁcation as the only tool in
town to implement the CA in relation to disability.
References
Bickenbach, J. E. (2011). Monitoring the United Nation’s Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities: data
and  the International Classiﬁcation of Functioning, Disability and Health. BMC Public Health,  11(Suppl. 4), S8.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1471-2458-11-S4-S8
Burchardt, T. (2004). Capabilities and disability: the capabilities framework and the social model of disability. Disability & Society,
19(1.).
Cerniauskaite, M.,  Quintas, R., Boldt, C., Raggi, A., Cieza, A., Bickenbach, J. E., & Leonardi, M. (2011). Systematic literature review
on  ICF from 2001 to 2009: its use, implementation and operationalisation. Disability and Rehabilitation,  33(4), 281–309.
Entwistle, V. A., & Watt, I. S. (2013). Treating patients as persons: a capabilities approach to support delivery of person-centered
care. The American Journal of Bioethics, 13(8), 29–39.
Hopper, K. (2007). Rethinking social recovery in schizophrenia: what a capabilities approach might offer. Social Science &
Medicine,  65,  868–879.
Madans, J., Loeb, M.,  & Altman, B. (2011). Measuring disability and monitoring the UN convention on the rights of persons with
disabilities: the work of the Washington Group on Disability Statistics. BMC Public Health,  11(Suppl. 4), S4.
Mitra, S. (2006). The capability approach and disability. Journal of Disability Policy Studies, 16(4), 236–247.
Mitra, S. (2013). Data revolution for disability-inclusive development. Lancet Global Health,  1(4), E178–E179.
Morris, C. (2009). Opinion: measuring participation in childhood disability: how does the capability approach improve our
understanding? Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology,  51,  92–94.
Okawa, Y., & Ueda, S. (2008). Implementation of the International Classiﬁcation of Functioning, Disability and Health in national
legislation and policy in Japan. International Journal of Rehabilitation Research, 31,  73–77.
Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Resnik, L. J., & Allen, S. M.  (2007). Using International Classiﬁcation of Functioning, Disability and Health to understand challenges
in  community reintegration of injured veterans. Journal of Rehabilitation Research & Development, 44, 991–1006.
Sen, A. K. (1980). Description as choice. Oxford Economic Papers,  32(3), 353–369.
Sen, A. K. (2009). The idea of justice.  Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Stein, M.,  & Silvers, A. (2007). Disability and the social contract. The University of Chicago Law Review, 74,  1635.
Terzi, L. (2005a). Beyond the dilemma of difference: the capability approach on disability and special educational needs. Journal
of  Philosophy of Education,  39(3), 443–459.
Terzi, L. (2005b). A capability perspective on impairment, disability and special needs: towards social justice in education.
Theory and Research in Education, 3(2), 197–223.
Trani, J. F., Bakhshi, P., Bellanca, N., Biggeri, M.,  & Marchetta, F. (2011). Disabilities through the capability approach lens:
implications for public policies. Alter-European Journal of Disability Research, 5(3), 143–157.
Trani, J. F., Bakhshi, P., Noor, A. A., & Mashkoor, A. (2009). Lack of a will or of a way? Taking a capability approach for analysing
disability policy shortcomings and ensuring programme impact in Afghanistan. European Journal of Development Research,
21(2),  297–319.
Ustun, T. B., Chatterji, S., Bickenbach, J. E., Kostanjsek, N., & Schneider, M.  (2003). International Classiﬁcation of Functioning,
Disability and Health: a new tool for understanding disability and health. Disability and Rehabilitation,  25(11–12), 565–571.
World Health Organization (WHO). (2001). International Classiﬁcation of Functioning, Disability and Health.  Geneva: WHO.
World Health Organisation. (2009). WHO  disability assessment schedule. http://www.who.int/classiﬁcations/icf/whodasii/en/
World Health Organization (WHO)-World Bank. (2011). World report on disability. Geneva: World Health Organization.
